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Public policy for the poor? A randomised assessment of the 
Mexican universal health insurance programme
Gary King, Emmanuela Gakidou, Kosuke Imai, Jason Lakin, Ryan T Moore, Clayton Nall, Nirmala Ravishankar, Manett Vargas, 
Martha María Téllez-Rojo, Juan Eugenio Hernández Ávila, Mauricio Hernández Ávila, Héctor Hernández Llamas
Summary
Background We assessed aspects of Seguro Popular, a programme aimed to deliver health insurance, regular and 
preventive medical care, medicines, and health facilities to 50 million uninsured Mexicans.
Methods We randomly assigned treatment within 74 matched pairs of health clusters—ie, health facility catchment 
areas—representing 118 569 households in seven Mexican states, and measured outcomes in a 2005 baseline survey 
(August, 2005, to September, 2005) and follow-up survey 10 months later (July, 2006, to August, 2006) in 50 pairs 
(n=32  515). The treatment consisted of encouragement to enrol in a health-insurance programme and upgraded 
medical facilities. Participant states also received funds to improve health facilities and to provide medications for 
services in treated clusters. We estimated intention to treat and complier average causal eﬀ  ects non-parametrically.
Findings Intention-to-treat estimates indicated a 23% reduction from baseline in catastrophic expenditures (1·9% 
points; 95% CI 0·14–3·66). The eﬀ  ect in poor households was 3·0% points (0·46–5·54) and in experimental compliers 
was 6·5% points (1·65–11·28), 30% and 59% reductions, respectively. The intention-to-treat eﬀ  ect on health spending 
in poor households was 426 pesos (39–812), and the complier average causal eﬀ  ect was 915 pesos (147–1684). Contrary 
to expectations and previous observational research, we found no eﬀ  ects on medication spending, health outcomes, 
or utilisation.
Interpretation Programme resources reached the poor. However, the programme did not show some other eﬀ  ects, 
possibly due to the short duration of treatment (10 months). Although Seguro Popular seems to be successful at this 
early stage, further experiments and follow-up studies, with longer assessment periods, are needed to ascertain the 
long-term eﬀ  ects of the programme.
Funding Mexican Ministry of Health, the National Institute of Public Health of Mexico, and Harvard University 
Institute for Quantitative Social Science.
Introduction
Health-system reforms often fail to provide the poor with 
access to quality care.
1 Mexico has attempted to avoid this 
shortcoming by implementing a new set of health 
reforms called Seguro Popular,
2 which aim to provide 
health coverage to 50 million uninsured Mexicans. The 
main aim of these health reforms of 2003, is to reduce 
the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditures by 
“(providing) social protection in health...”.
3 Seguro 
Popular consists of health policies
4 and priorities,
5 
including entitlements for aﬃ   liated families, well-deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ   ts packages including coverage for 266 unique 
health interventions, 312 medicines, increased funds to 
state health ministries proportional to the number of 
Seguro Popular-aﬃ     liated families, federal funds for 
personal and non-personal health services, and creation 
of special federal funds for catastrophic medical 
expenditures associated with certain diseases.
6 By linking 
federal support to medical facility quality, Seguro Popular 
aims to strengthen an accreditation system for health 
clinics and hospitals. When rollout is complete, Seguro 
Popular is intended to increase total health spending in 
Mexico by a full percentage point of gross domestic 
product (from 5·6% in 2002).
7
Seguro Popular sought to build a stronger evidence 
base by permitting a rigorous, independent, scientiﬁ  c 
assessment of the programme. Here, we present an 
experimental assessment of these health reforms. We 
introduce aspects of a so called stepped wedge 
experimental design,
8,9 which uses the phased rollout of 
the national programme to make randomisation 
politically feasible and ethical. We also discuss 
expectations, including the idea that Seguro Popular 
funds would reach the poor and increase health-care 
utilisation.
Methods
Experimental design
Using a real-world health policy programme as an 
experimental treatment oﬀ  ers tremendous advantages 
but also requires changes in research design and 
interpretation to anticipate political and implementation 
challenges.
8 As discussed by King and colleagues,
8 “The 
history of public policy experiments is littered with 
evaluations torpedoed by politicians appropriately 
attentive to the short term desires of their constituents,   
such as those who wind up in control groups without 
new services or who cannot imagine why a government 
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would randomly assign citizens to government 
programs”. Our design is adapted to survive these types 
of interventions.
We developed an experimental design within the 
phased rollout of Seguro Popular to introduce random 
assignment. Within selected communities waiting for 
the programme rollout, we assigned some communities 
to receive Seguro Popular at least a year earlier than 
expected, marshalling procedures that would otherwise 
be based on state implementation plans for clinic 
accreditation and population coverage. The design is 
robust to several types of politically-driven experimental 
protocol violations.
8
W  e designed a matched-pair cluster-randomised ex-
periment. First, we deﬁ   ned 12  284 health clusters—
contiguous geographical regions of Mexico’s 32 states. 
Each cluster includes a (present or planned) health 
clinic or hospital and the population in its catchment 
area. In collaboration with the ministry of health and 
the Seguro Popular commission, we persuaded 
13 Mexican states to join the assessment, in-
cluding 7078 (5439 rural and 1639 urban) health 
clusters. We paired health clusters before random-
isation, ensuring that matches were as similar as 
possible to each other for cluster size and various 
background characteristics.
10,11 We then negotiated 
access to 74 cluster pairs in seven states (ﬁ  gure 1), with 
inclusion based on necessary administrative, political, 
and other criteria.
We randomly assigned one health cluster from each 
pair to be the treatment cluster, which meant a campaign 
to persuade every family to enrol in Seguro Popular, and 
procedures initiated by states to improve health facilities 
and increase medical personnel and drug supplies to 
implement the programme eﬀ  ectively. Poor families in 
treatment clusters already participating in the pre-existing 
Oportunidades anti-poverty programme were enrolled in 
Seguro Popular automatically by the state; therefore, for 
this group the campaign informed them of their new 
rights under Seguro Popular. The list of beneﬁ  ts in these 
areas is extensive and has been published,
12 so that 
intended beneﬁ  ciaries would be aware of their rights in 
discussions with health clinics. The control health cluster 
in each pair received nothing extra and had the usual 
for-pay health care.
We published extensive details of our research design, 
baseline statistical analysis, and expectations of empirical 
results, including reports of large meetings with federal 
and state oﬃ     cials aimed to elicit and reveal their 
benchmarks for success,
8 before analysing any outcome. 
Among other concerns, we anticipated heterogeneity in 
states’ and localities’ compliance with programme 
requirements and federal directives, and in individual-level 
non-compliance. Although state governments in our 
treatment areas undertook substantial media campaigns 
to encourage aﬃ   liation and to reduce barriers to aﬃ   liation 
by establishing programme oﬃ   ces, individuals were free 
to decide whether to aﬃ   liate.
Sonora
San Luis Potosí
Estado de México
Guerrero
Morelos
Oaxaca
Jalisco
Figure 1: Mexican states participating in the Seguro Popular assessmentArticles
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Sample selection
Before the baseline survey, power calculations and 
administrative constraints indicated that we would be 
able to interview up to about 380 randomly chosen 
households in each of the 100 clusters. We selected 
100 clusters from the original 148, emphasising 
within-pair similarity (to increase experimental control 
and statistical eﬃ     ciency) and expected household 
compliance with the experimental protocol. Failure to 
pair before randomisation would have increased our 
standard errors by as much as 600%.
13 Some clusters 
from each of the seven states are included: Guerrero (8), 
Jalisco (2), Estado de México (54), Morelos (26), Oaxaca (4), 
San Luis Potosí (4), and Sonora (2).
As with most clinical experiments, the set of clusters we 
could randomly assign to treatment was not a random 
selection from all clusters eligible for Seguro Popular 
nationwide, but was determined by constraints imposed 
by the timing of the experimental intervention and the 
ability of state governments to cooperate. We further 
narrowed the available clusters by a selection based on 
the closeness of the match and the likelihood of complying 
with the experiment. Our population was similar to that 
eligible within the 12  284 original clusters identiﬁ  ed for 
the experiment nationwide (10 616 rural and 1668 urban).
Figure 2 shows six demographic variables in the 
national population of health clusters eligible for the 
experiment (n=12 284), our original sample of 148 health 
clusters, and our ﬁ  nal sample of 100 health clusters. The 
diﬀ  erences for the proportion of the population earning 
less than twice the minimum wage, mean years of 
education, the proportion of children younger than 4 years 
of age, the proportion of people employed, the proportion 
of female-headed households, and the proportion of 
people without social security rights (ie, eligible to enrol 
in Seguro Popular), between the clusters were mostly 
small. Unfortunately, we did not have data for outcomes 
of interest for all clusters nationally, such as individual 
health and health spending outcomes, which would have 
provided clearer information on external validity.
Survey methods
We did a baseline survey at the time of random assignment 
that attempted to contact 36  181 randomly selected 
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Figure 2: Comparisons between selected and all health clusters
Each histogram (density estimates) of health clusters indicates the national population (blue lines), our original sample of 148 (red lines), and our ﬁ  nal sample of 
100 (green lines). These histograms display the distribution of eligible cluster statistics, not the distribution for Mexican people or families.Articles
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households in the 100 selected clusters. We collected family 
spending data from the head of household and individual 
data from an adult randomly selected with a Kish table.
14 A 
total of 32  515 households were at least partially surveyed 
in the baseline phase (a 90% response rate). We previously 
used this survey
8 to validate the randomisation by verifying 
balance between treatment and control groups on 
background covariates and measures of the outcomes of 
interest at the time of random assignment, but before any 
treatment was administered. We found a pattern indicating 
potential bias in only one of our eight categories of 
variables: for the self-reported health variables, in the 
treatment group the poor tend to report that they are 
slightly healthier and the rich that they are sicker than 
those in the control group. Although the pattern is within 
what might be expected because of random chance, a 
placebo-like eﬀ  ect is also possible, and therefore we also 
adjusted for this by estimating the average treatment eﬀ  ect 
using diﬀ  erence-in-diﬀ   erence analysis (which had no 
eﬀ  ect for any other set of variables).
About 10 months later, we did a follow-up survey of 
households that we could reach during the baseline 
survey, fully or partially re-interviewing 29 897 households 
(ﬁ  gure 3). We deﬁ  ned a partially completed survey as one 
which obtained at least a household’s Seguro Popular 
aﬃ   liation status at the follow-up survey.
Our major expenditure variables had only 1–2% missing 
values at baseline, and were only 8% missing in the 
assessment survey. We used standard multiple imputation 
techniques for missing values.
15–17 These are described in 
the webappendix and were implemented as planned.
8
Outcomes and quantities of interest
We identiﬁ  ed outcomes of interest from the follow-up 
survey, focusing on expenditures—which was the main 
aim of Seguro Popular. Out-of-pocket health expenditures 
for all services, inpatient and outpatient care, medical 
devices, and medication were measured by annualising 
the head of household’s self-reported out-of-pocket health 
spending in those categories during the previous 
1–3 months. Catastrophic expenditures are deﬁ  ned on 
the basis of the share of a household’s spending, after a 
minimal food budget that is allocated to health care. If a 
household’s health spending exceeded 30% of the 
capacity to pay, the household was regarded as suﬀ  ering 
catastrophic health expenditures. Other outcomes 
included self-reported health risk factors, health 
self-assessments, a blood pressure test and blood test for 
cholesterol, women’s and maternal health variables 
(webappendix).
We examined these outcomes for several subgroups, 
as planned. We estimated causal eﬀ   ects for both 
low-asset and high-asset households. A household was 
deﬁ  ned as high-asset if it had at least half of the following 
items: a cement or tile (non-dirt) ﬂ  oor,  electricity, 
washing machine, gas stove, refrigerator, phone, 
television, computer, and second home; and as low-asset 
otherwise. Other ways of aggregating these measures 
yielded similar conclusions. 55% of households in our 
sample fell into the high-asset category. The proportion 
of high-asset households in a pair is used as a cluster 
wealth measure. We also examined the programme’s 
eﬀ   ect on female-headed households. We separately 
examined various individual-level outcomes using the 
same asset strata and, where appropriate, sex and age 
groups.
For every outcome variable, we present two causal 
quantities of interest. The ﬁ   rst is an estimate of the 
intention-to-treat eﬀ   ect, which is the total eﬀ  ect  of 
assigning a cluster to the programme (ie, upgrading 
medical facilities, providing insurance, encouraging 
households to enrol) regardless of experimental protocol 
compliance. The second quantity of interest is the 
complier average causal eﬀ   ect (CACE), which is the 
programme’s eﬀ  ect on compliers, the (latent) group of 
individuals who would adhere to whatever treatment 
status they were randomly assigned to. CACE requires 
100 clusters (65 072 households)
paired on covariates
50 clusters (34 096 households)
assigned treatment
50 clusters (30 976 households)
assigned control
17 950 households randomly
sampled within clusters
17 907 households sampled by
baseline canvassers
16 259 households targeted for
follow-up in panel survey
14 949 households partially or fully
surveyed at follow-up
6744 households enrolled
8205 households unenrolled
14 948 households partially or fully
surveyed at follow-up
1076 households enrolled
13 872 households unenrolled
16 256 households after multiple
imputation
(ﬁve imputed data sets)
1205 households enrolled
15 051 households unenrolled
16 259 households after multiple
imputation
(ﬁve imputed data sets)
7212 households enrolled
9047 households unenrolled
16 256 households targeted for
follow-up in panel survey
16 260 households partially or
fully surveyed at baseline
16 261 households partially or
fully surveyed at baseline
18 307 households sampled by
baseline canvassers
18 231 households randomly
sampled within clusters
Figure 3: Flowchart describing randomisation protocol, sampling, survey 
panel attrition, and experimental compliance
Numbers are drawn from the household survey. Item-level non-response varied 
slightly for individual outcomes, and imputations done on multiple data sets 
produced slightly diﬀ  erent imputations for programme aﬃ   liation totals.
See Online for webappendixArticles
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estimating and excluding from the analysis two types of 
households that by assumption do not beneﬁ  t from the 
programme: never-takers—who are wealthy households 
and others who would not have enrolled in the programme 
regardless of their treatment assignment—and 
always-takers—typically highly motivated families who 
take advantage of the programme regardless of their 
treatment assignment. Estimation of intention to treat 
requires almost no statistical assumptions; therefore, we 
could use specially designed non-parametric methods.
13 
Estimation of CACE requires the assumption that only 
compliers beneﬁ  t from Seguro Popular, which could be 
wrong in the long term but seemed reasonable for our 
10-month assessment, and a few technical assumptions 
well-documented in the statistics literature
18 and in the 
webappendix.
13 All information needed to replicate the 
results in this report are publicly available.
19
Role of the funding source
This project was partly supported by the Mexican Ministry 
of Health, which is responsible for Seguro Popular, and 
several authors were employed there. All data remained 
in the custody of Harvard University’s Institute for 
Quantitative Social Science (IQSS), where researchers 
retained responsibility for data assembly and analysis.
The corresponding author was not employed by the 
ministry of health, had full access to the data, retained 
the right to publish results without previous review, and 
had ﬁ  nal responsibility to submit for publication. Surveys 
were done by the National Institute of Public Health of 
Mexico, with funding from the ministry of health. IQSS 
provided other funding.
Results
A small number of households in control clusters 
enrolled in the programme, whereas many individuals in 
treatment clusters chose not to enrol. In control clusters, 
the self-report of aﬃ   liation rate was low (7%; 1205 of 
16 256 households). In the treatment clusters, 44% (7212 
of 16  259) of households reported being aﬃ   liated. We 
estimated that low-asset health clusters were composed 
of: 54% compliers, 37% never-takers (including 10–15% 
with pre-existing coverage), and 9% always-takers. In 
high-asset health clusters, these ﬁ  gures were 20%, 74%, 
and 6%, respectively.
We also estimated the eﬀ  ect of assignment on aﬃ   liation, 
stratifying by cluster socioeconomic level and household-
wealth level (ﬁ  gure 4). Results indicated that treatment 
assignment was much more eﬀ  ective in poorer areas than 
in areas with higher-asset ownership. Surprisingly, 
however, treatment assignment was not more eﬀ  ective 
for low-asset than for high-asset house  holds. Our data 
suggest that uptake of the programme was mainly related 
to the wealth of the geographic area rather than of the 
individual family. Those with more assets living in poor 
areas are as likely to aﬃ   liate with Seguro Popular as their 
poorer neighbours.
Finally, we investigated households in our treatment 
clusters already enrolled in the Oportunidades anti-
 poverty  programme, who had automatic access to Seguro 
Popular. We found that only 66% (5043 of 7628) of 
Oportunidades respondents in treated areas were aware 
of their automatic aﬃ   liation. Oportunidades recipients in 
poorer clusters were more likely to be aware of their 
aﬃ   liation than recipients in wealthier clusters (ﬁ  gure 4).
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The primary purpose of our assessment was to estimate 
the eﬀ   ect of Seguro Popular on the percentage of 
households with catastrophic health expenditures, as 
well as out-of-pocket costs. Table 1 shows that 8∙4% of 
our control group sample spent more than 30% of their 
post-subsistence income (ie, capacity to spend after a 
minimal food budget) on health care in the past year. 
During the 10-month assessment period, Seguro Popular 
reduced by 23% the proportion of all respondents 
experiencing catastrophic expenditures (table 1). Among 
compliers, Seguro Popular reduced the proportion of 
catastrophic expenditures by 55%. Most of the overall 
eﬀ  ect occurred in poorer households. Eﬀ  ects for high-
asset families and female-headed households were 
smaller but still positive, and measured with about the 
same precision.
Table 2 shows the causal eﬀ  ect of Seguro Popular on 
out-of-pocket expenditures for health care. Average 
out-of-pocket health expenditures in the control group 
were about MXN$1631 overall, with higher-asset 
households spending more on care than low-asset 
households. Among experimental compliers, the eﬀ  ects 
were about double the intention-to-treat eﬀ  ect.  High-
asset and female-headed households had eﬀ  ects  that 
were slightly smaller than those for low-asset households, 
albeit less precisely measured. Seguro Popular also 
reduced out-of-pocket expenses for inpatient and out-
patient medical care, overall and for poor households, but 
had no detectable positive eﬀ   ect on spending for 
medication and medical devices.
We assessed the eﬀ  ects of Seguro Popular on various 
other outcomes: use of medical facilities, modiﬁ  able risk 
factors, measures of the diagnosis and coverage for 
chronic illness, and health self-assessments (table 3).
Before the study was started, government oﬃ   cials had 
expressed concern about the short assessment period, 
but expected that the programme would produce at least 
some eﬀ  ect on the use of regular and preventive medical 
services at this initial stage.
8 Our ﬁ  ndings do not conﬁ  rm 
these expectations or those in related previous 
observational research.
6,7,20 We found that Seguro Popular 
had no substantial eﬀ  ect on use of medical services, 
regardless of how it was measured and the subgroup 
studied. Indeed, most point estimates are negative, 
indicating a slight drop in services in the treated 
compared with control clusters. Separate subgroup 
analyses for low-asset, high-asset, and female-headed 
households also showed no signiﬁ  cant  eﬀ  ects   
(webappendix).
We also estimated satisfaction with the programme. 
Among Seguro Popular enrolees, 69% rated the quality 
of health services as very good or good (as opposed to 
moderate, bad, or very bad), and 85% reported that 
programme beneﬁ   ts were explained by programme 
oﬃ     cials in a manner that was clear or very clear. 
Furthermore, 94% reported that they were treated well 
during the aﬃ   liation process and 97% planned to enrol 
again in the follow-up period.
Finally, we examined the eﬀ  ects of Seguro Popular on 
nine separate health self-assessments, by both intention 
to treat and CACE. Seguro Popular eﬀ   ects on these 
outcome variables were positive and measured with 
precision. Unfortunately, but as anticipated, this eﬀ  ect 
was only apparent because slightly positive eﬀ  ects 
All participants Experimental compliers only
Control 
group*
ITT SE 95% CI Control 
group*
CACE SE 95% CI
All  8·4 1·9† 0·9 0·2 to 3·7 9·5 5·2† 2·3 0·8 to 9·6
Low asset 9·9 3·0† 1·3 0·5 to 5·5 11·0 6·5† 2·5 1·6 to 11·3
High asset 7·1 0·9 0·8 –0·7 to 2·5 7·9 3·0 2·7 –2·3 to 8·4
Female-headed 8·5 1·4 1·1 0·7 to 3·5 9·6 3·8 3·0 –2·1 to 9·7
ITT=intention to treat. SE=standard error. CACE=complier average causal eﬀ  ect. *Average value of the variable, as a 
baseline. †p≤0·05 (one-tailed t test). Positive values correspond to favourable outcomes. Catastrophic expenditures are 
deﬁ  ned as out-of-pocket health expenses greater than 30% of post-subsistence income. 
Table 1: Causal eﬀ  ect of rolling out Seguro Popular on the reduction in the number of households 
suﬀ  ering catastrophic health expenditures
  All participants Experimental compliers only
Control group* ITT SE Control group* CACE SE
Overall
All 1631·3 258·0 175 1712·7 689·7 453
Low asset 1360·2 425·6† 197 1502·6 915·3† 392
High asset 1867·9 128·4 201 1933·2 428·2 669
Female-headed 1509·1 156·5 207 1535·0 428·6 566
Inpatient care
All 532·5 96·9† 44 557·1 259·1† 112
Low asset 527·1 188·2† 73 579·0 404·8† 142
High asset 537·2 31·1 52 536·2 103·6 173
Female-headed 452·5 115·1† 68 463·3 315·2† 182
Outpatient care
All 448·3 116·7† 63 499·1 312·0† 161
Low asset 412·3 176·7† 73 466·3 380·0† 147
High asset 479·7 81·9 69 533·0 272·9 230
Female-headed 416·3 110·4 75 451·3 302·4 202
Medicine
All 521·1 20·0 41 534·5 53·3 109
Low asset 427·3 17·8 46 444·7 38·3 100
High asset 603·0 29·4 47 627·5 98·1 157
Female-headed 625·6 53·6 55 671·2 146·8 151
Medical devices
All 139·7 –8·8 23 117·8 –23·4 62
Low asset 72·0 –0·2 20 72·8 –0·5 43
High asset 198·8 –16·5 29 165·6 –55·1 98
Female-headed 155·5 10·9 34 147·9 30·0 94
ITT=intention to treat. SE=standard error. CACE= complier average causal eﬀ  ect. *Average value of the variable, as a 
baseline. †p≤0·05 (one-tailed t test). Values are expressed in MXN$. Positive values correspond to favourable outcomes. 
Inpatient care includes self-reported spending on staying overnight in a hospital or health clinic, whereas outpatient care 
includes spending on medical care that did not require an overnight stay. Medicine includes spending on traditional and 
non-traditional medications, whereas medical devices include glasses, prostheses, hearing aids, and others. 
Table 2: Causal eﬀ  ect of Seguro Popular on the self-reported out-of-pocket health expendituresArticles
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appeared even in the baseline survey.
8 To check whether 
the results at 10 months were aﬀ  ected by these placebo 
diﬀ  erences, we estimated the average treatment eﬀ  ect of 
individuals’ diﬀ  erence between the follow-up period and 
baseline. With this diﬀ  erence-in-diﬀ  erence analysis, the 
average eﬀ   ects of the programme on health 
self-assessments on individuals in various subgroups, 
including high-asset and low-asset households and in 
women, are small and close to zero. This result 
emphasises the importance of a baseline survey in 
protecting from placebo eﬀ   ects even in large-scale 
non-double-blind public policy assessments.
Discussion
We assessed a new public policy that increases health-care 
funding to Mexican states. It grants them additional 
administrative responsibility while improving federal 
supervision, and it provides individuals with health 
insurance and information resources. Although the new 
stewardship model of health-care delivery that Seguro 
Popular intended to implement
4,21 (compared with 
previous centralised and decentralised systems) has been 
supported by conceptual and observational studies, no 
country pursuing such a model in its health sector has 
previously done a large-scale randomised scientiﬁ  c 
assessment.
That Mexico may now have a validated architecture for 
delivering health services to the poor seems to be the 
most surprising and encouraging result from this 
experiment. We found that the stewardship of Seguro 
Popular has been successful in reducing overall 
catastrophic and out-of-pocket expenditures for inpatient 
and outpatient medical procedures, especially in the 
poorest individuals.
We identiﬁ  ed several issues with Seguro Popular that 
could indicate implementation challenges or other 
diﬃ   culties in the design of the policy. In our sample, 
after 10 months the programme had neither reduced 
spending on medication nor increased health-care use 
or diagnoses. Our surveys do not ascertain whether the 
result means that there was no eﬀ  ect at all, whether the 
reduction in price did not lead to an increase in quantity 
of drugs, or whether a change will arise over a period 
longer than 10 months. Although neither we nor large 
groups of federal and state experts, political appointees, 
and programme oﬃ   cials anticipated this ﬁ  nding, the 
result might be explained by the short assessment 
period, similar to the experience in other areas that 
adopt new health programmes (eg, in Massachusetts, a 
recently implemented universal health insurance 
programme is also associated with diﬃ   culties in ﬁ  nding 
a family primary care physician and an increase in the 
number of physicians refusing new patients).
22  The 
aﬃ   liation programme could be improved, especially in 
the enrolment of poor families living in relatively 
wealthy communities. Similarly, treatment-cluster 
households in the Oportunidades anti-poverty pro-
gramme were aﬃ     liated automatically, but a third of 
them were not aware of this fact. Our assessment has 
thus given the federal stewards of Seguro Popular some 
of the knowledge they need to further improve and 
assess the programme.
After randomisation, the ﬁ  rst step to complete the 
intervention was to aﬃ   liate the eligible population to 
Seguro Popular. We did this successfully, reaching an 
aﬃ   liation rate of 44% in intervention areas. These high 
rates of aﬃ     liation made an immediate impact on 
out-of-pocket expenses possible, because beneﬁ  ciaries 
used health-care facilities at no cost. The no-charge 
policy became eﬀ   ective immediately after aﬃ   liation, 
which made it possible for us to document a signiﬁ  cant 
reduction in the prevalence of households with 
catastrophic health expenditure. However, other 
components of the operation of Seguro Popular require 
complex administrative actions, before rollout is 
complete. For example, the improvement of drug 
supplies required purchase using open bids that, in the 
best of cases, took 6–8 months to be completed. In the 
same way, the process of hiring and training new 
medical staﬀ   willing to work in these remote clinics and 
the eventual accreditation of medical facilities required 
more time than was available during our assessment 
period.
Results from this study diﬀ   er from those of 
observational studies for several reasons. The absence of 
an eﬀ   ect on medication expenditures is surprising 
because of the aims of the programme and past 
observational results, which found that Seguro Popular 
families spend about 14% less on drugs than uninsured 
families,
6 and suggested that the programme had made 
drugs more available and aﬀ  ordable.
9 Other observational 
studies had reported that the number of hospital 
discharges increased with overall Seguro Popular 
All participants Experimental compliers only
Control 
group*
ITT SE Control 
group*
CACE SE
Utilisation (procedures)
Used outpatient services 62·6% –1·5% 1·9% 64·8% –4·0% 5·2%
Outpatient visits (count) 1·6 –0·03 0·09 1·7 –0·08 0·23
Hospitalised 7·6% –0·2% 0·5% 7·9% –0·5% 1·3%
Hospitalisations (count)  0·1 –0·003 0·006 0·1 –0·01 0·02
Satisfaction with provider 68·0% –1·0% 1·6% 69·8% –2·6% 4·5%
Utilisation (preventative)
Eye exam (past year) 10·0% –0·7% 0·7% 9·8% –1·8% 1·9%
Flu vaccine 25·7% –1·8% 1·4% 27·2% –4·9% 3·7%
Mammogram (past year) 5·1% –0·9% 0·6% 5·2% –2·3% 1·6%
Cervical (past year) 21·8% –1·3% 2·0% 22·2% –3·2 4·8%
Pap test (past year) 31·9% –2·3% 2·1% 33·2% –5·8% 5·0%
*Average value of the variable, as a baseline. Data are percentages, unless otherwise indicated. ITT=intention to treat. 
SE=standard error. CACE=complier average causal eﬀ  ect.
Table 3: Causal eﬀ  ect of Seguro Popular on utilisation of medical procedures and preventive careArticles
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enrolment, and eﬀ   ective coverage rates for various 
medical services were higher for Seguro Popular 
individuals than for those uninsured.
6 Some of these 
diﬀ   erences might arise from the short assessment 
period, diﬀ   erent observation periods or target 
populations, or from bias in the observational studies 
that our ability to randomise enables us to avoid.
Continued assessment of the programme is needed. 
Furthermore, we could only make inferences about our 
study areas and similar communities. Expanding the 
study to include parallel experiments with new groups in 
additional health clusters in other parts of the country 
would strengthen generalisations to the nation. Finally, 
although Seguro Popular is unprecedented in scope, we 
could only test the eﬀ  ects of the programme as a whole 
rather than each component. We hope that other 
researchers will continue this research and apply our 
experimental design to other public policy reforms, both 
in Mexico and elsewhere.
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